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Five	takeaways	from	Slovakia’s	parliamentary
elections
Slovakia	held	parliamentary	elections	on	29	February.	The	election	saw	Smer-SD,	which	has	been	in
power	since	2012,	suffer	a	significant	drop	in	support,	slipping	to	second	place	behind	the	opposition
Ordinary	People	party.	Michael	Rossi	presents	five	key	takeaways	from	the	results.
Two	years	after	the	murder	of	Slovak	investigative	journalist	Ján	Kuciak	and	his	fiancée	Martina
Kusnirova	that	shocked	the	country	and	served	as	a	catalyst	for	a	disillusioned	but	otherwise	passive
population	to	take	action,	voters	participated	in	parliamentary	elections	that	may	alter	the	country’s	image	and
political	trajectory.
The	murders	underscored	the	widely	held	belief	that	Slovakia	is	run	by	a	triangulated	cadre	of	powerful	oligarchs,
political	bosses,	and	organised	criminal	syndicates.	Marián	Kočner,	the	Slovak	businessman	accused	of	ordering
the	hit	on	Kuciak,	has	a	number	of	ties	with	both	the	criminal	underworld	and	Slovakia’s	political	elite,	including	the
country’s	most	prominent	political	power	broker	Robert	Fico,	leader	of	the	ruling	Smer-SD	(Direction-Social
Democracy)	that	has	governed	the	state	for	the	last	eight	years.
Though	corruption	and	illiberal	democratic	government	are	no	strangers	to	either	Slovakia	or	any	other	Central	(or
Eastern)	European	state	for	that	matter,	the	public	outcry	over	Kuciak’s	murder	has	translated	into	voter	anger	at
Smer-SD	in	particular	and	the	poor	state	of	affairs	of	Slovakian	politics	in	general.	Shortly	after	the	murder,	Fico
was	forced	to	resign	as	Slovakia’s	prime	minister.	One	year	later	in	a	much	publicised	presidential	election,	the
lawyer	and	environmental	activist	Zuzana	Čaputová,	a	political	novice	who	entered	the	race	on	an	anti-corruption
platform,	bested	the	Fico-endorsed	Maroš	Šefčovič	in	a	race	lauded	in	western	media	circles	as	a	defeat	of
populism	and	nationalism.
The	29	February	parliamentary	elections	were	projected	to	be	a	continuation	of	public	anger	at	the	status	quo	and
an	opportunity	to	elect	political	alternatives.	But	given	the	nature	of	the	number	of	parties	competing	along	with	a
majority	of	them	espousing	some	form	of	national	populism,	the	outcome	offers	little	optimism	for	anyone	hopeful
Slovakia	is	turning	towards	liberal	democracy.	At	present,	there	are	five	clear	takeaways	from	the	electoral	results.
1.	 The	election	was	a	referendum	on	Smer-SD
No	political	party	in	Slovakia	is	currently	perceived	by	its	citizens	to	be	more	synonymous	with	corruption,
clientelism,	nepotism,	and	patronage	than	Smer-SD.	For	nearly	fifteen	years	(including	four	in	opposition),	Smer-SD
has	dominated	all	forms	of	Slovakia’s	political	life	and	has,	in	many	ways,	inherited	the	mantle	of	illiberal
government	and	political	oligarchism	from	the	Vladimír	Mečiar	era	of	the	1990s.
While	it	is	not	unexpected	that	a	society	disillusioned	with	current	political,	economic,	and	social	conditions	lays
blame	with	the	incumbent	government,	public	anger	at	Smer-SD	is	particularly	acute	in	the	wake	of	Kuciak’s
murder.	Its	leaders	openly	engage	in	graft	and	flaunt	their	wealth,	privilege,	and	political	immunity	to	citizens
increasingly	beset	by	economic	woes,	limited	job	opportunities,	crumbling	state	services,	and	the	brain	drain
abroad.
At	the	top	of	this	pyramid	sits	Robert	Fico	who,	like	a	party	boss	of	the	1990s,	dispenses	favours	and	offers	legal
protection	to	allies.	Those	like	Kočner	whom	he	can’t	defend	are	simply	disavowed	out	of	political	self-preservation.
The	hubristic	confidence	he	exudes	reminds	one	of	Donald	Trump,	who	along	with	other	political	strongmen	like
Viktor	Orbán	and	Vladimir	Putin,	are	seen	as	role	models.	Like	Trump,	Fico	is	prone	to	turn	any	national	event	or
tragedy	into	a	personal	issue,	such	as	when	he	recently	spoke	at	one	of	the	commemorations	of	Kuciak’s	murder
and	opined	that	“if	it	wasn’t	for	the	murder,	I’d	be	standing	here	in	front	of	you	today	as	Prime	Minister	with	30%
support.”
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Given	the	public	anger	reflected	in	last	year’s	presidential	election,	it	is	no	surprise	this	sentiment	carried	into	this
year’s	parliamentary	contest,	as	all	analyses	leading	up	to	the	February	elections	predicted	not	just	a	loss	for	Smer,
but	a	loss	depriving	them	of	the	ability	to	form	a	governing	coalition.	All	political	opponents	from	centre-left	to	far-
right	were	united	in	one	common	goal:	to	unseat	Smer	as	the	ruling	party	and	dismantle	its	Tammany-like	political
machine.	The	predictions	were	correct.	Smer-SD	lost	nearly	half	its	seats,	and	while	it	still	placed	second,	it	stands
little	chance	of	being	in	a	governing	coalition.
Figure	1:	Preliminary	results	of	the	2020	Slovakian	parliamentary	election
	
Note:	Referenced	from	the	Slovak	Spectator
2.	 But	it	also	should	have	been	an	endorsement	of	PS/Spolu
Less	clear	than	Smer’s	loss	was	what	would	become	of	the	Progressive	Slovakia/Together	(PS/Spolu)	coalition
after	its	victory	in	both	Slovakia’s	presidential	and	European	Parliamentary	elections	last	year.
At	the	time,	Zuzana	Čaputová’s	victory	was	hailed	as	a	major	milestone	for	Slovakia’s	beleaguered	liberal
democratic	movement,	and	a	blow	to	the	perception	that	Central	Europe	is	awash	in	national	populism.	So
important	was	her	candidacy	that	a	country	usually	ignored	outside	the	region	suddenly	made	headlines	across
American,	British,	and	European	newspapers.	Since	becoming	president,	Čaputová	is	Slovakia’s	most	trusted
politician,	the	only	politician	whom	people	trust	more	than	they	distrust,	and	according	to	The	New	Yorker,	is	“a	lone
political	voice	in	a	sea	of	demagoguery”.	Given	the	conditions	of	Slovakia’s	political	culture	of	disappointment,	this
is	a	rare	honour	to	hold.
However,	that	trust	has	not	translated	into	votes	for	her	party	coalition,	as	PS/Spolu	failed	to	cross	the	electoral
threshold	necessary	to	seat	members.	Like	most	parliamentary	democracies,	Slovakia	operates	along	a	“5%	rule”
that	requires	parties	needing	at	least	5%	of	the	popular	vote	in	order	to	qualify	for	seats	in	parliament.	But	because
PS	is	working	in	a	pre-arranged	coalition	with	Spolu,	the	threshold	is	raised	to	7%.
At	last	count,	PS/Spolu	finished	with	6.96%	of	the	vote,	a	hair’s	length	away	from	entry.	Some	may	discuss	the	lost
opportunity	of	offering	Za	L’udí,	a	small	conservative-progressive	party	that	just	passed	the	threshold	at	5.77%,	a
third	spot	in	its	coalition.	Either	way,	the	low	votes	are	a	massive	disappointment	for	a	party	and	a	movement	seen
as	a	champion	of	liberal	democracy,	feminism,	LGBTQ	rights,	secularism,	and	cosmopolitanism.	Additionally,	it	is	a
confirmation	that	Čaputova’s	victory	last	year	was	less	a	stand	against	populism	and	conservatism,	and	more	a
rejection	of	corruption.
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Figure	2:	Seats	in	parliament	following	the	2020	Slovakian	parliamentary	elections
Note:	Referenced	from	the	Slovak	Spectator
3.	 The	four	largest	parties	embrace	some	form	of	populism;	three	of	which	are	conservative	and
parochial
The	big	winner	in	Slovakia’s	parliamentary	election	is	the	Ordinary	People	and	Independent	Personalities	(Obyčajní
Ľudia	a	nezávislé	osobnosti,	OĽaNO)	Party,	which	earned	a	massive	25%	of	the	votes	and	a	mandate	to	form	a
new	government	with	53	seats	in	a	150	seat	legislature.	An	even	bigger	winner	is	its	party	head	Igor	Matovič,
whose	political	charisma	and	acumen	elevated	the	party’s	popular	standing	within	the	last	month	and	a	half.
Though	Matovič	can	certainly	be	credited	for	his	ability	to	mobilise	voters	and	identify	socio-economic	problems,	his
party	being	centre-right	and	operating	on	philosophies	of	Christian-democracy	certainly	helped	in	a	country	where
the	electorate	is	largely	conservative,	Catholic,	and	parochial.	This	also	helps	explain	the	electoral	success	of	two
other	parties:	the	Eurosceptic	We	Are	Family	(SME	Rodina)	Party,	and	the	far-right	People’s	Party	–	Our	Slovakia
(Ľudová	strana	–	Naše	Slovensko,	ĽSNS),	which	came	in	third	and	fourth	respectively.	What	this	means	is	that
Slovakia’s	parliament	will	be	dominated	by	conservatives,	populists,	parochialists,	and	remnants	of	Smer-SD’s
entrenched	elite,	leaving	little	room	for	liberal	democratic	progressivism	and	almost	no	left-wing	policies.
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The	largest	threat	to	Slovakia’s	political	scene	is	the	evolution	of	ĽSNS	from	a	peripheral	neo-fascist	movement	to	a
mainstream	party.	Its	long-time	leader	Marian	Kotleba	fashions	himself	as	the	heir	to	the	Slovak	Republic,	a
wartime	Nazi	collaborationist	state,	and	has	openly	promoted	anti-Roma	policies	similar	to	far-right	movements	in
Hungary.	Kotleba	has	recently	attempted	to	have	his	party	become	more	socially	accepted.	That	means
abandoning	both	the	black	uniforms	of	the	Nazi-era	Hlinka	Guard	and	the	night-time	torchlight	marches	through
cities	and	towns.
But	along	with	this	modernisation	comes	a	type	of	political	savviness	indicative	of	right-wing	populist	groups	eager
to	connect	with	“ordinary”	citizens	and	present	themselves	as	the	only	socio-political	alternative	to	a	series	of
parties	tainted	with	links	to	oligarchs	and	scandals.	Additionally,	the	ĽSNS	has	been	successful	via	social	media
reaching	out	to	younger	Slovaks	disillusioned	with	the	system	and	eager	to	support	quick-fix	solutions	to	seemingly
insurmountable	problems.
The	problem	with	ĽSNS	isn’t	that	it	stands	a	chance	of	entering	government,	but	rather	that	in	an	attempt	at
distancing	themselves	from	the	radioactivity	of	ĽSNS,	other	right-wing	conservative	parties	have	begun	mimicking
their	rhetoric	and	advocating	several	of	their	policies	that	they	know	resonate	with	Slovaks.	For	older	Slovaks,	this
means	steadfast	adherence	to	faith,	family,	and	fatherland.	For	the	disaffected	youth,	this	means	anti-elitism,	anti-
globalism,	and	anti-capitalism.	Whatever	the	reason,	Kotleba’s	policies	are	becoming	normalised	in	Slovak	political
discourse.
4.	 Coalition	forming	seems	uncertain
The	present	arrangement	of	parties	that	qualified	for	seats	in	parliament	presents	another	conundrum.	Both	Smer-
SD,	which	came	in	second	with	18.2%	of	the	vote	(38	seats),	and	ĽSNS,	which	came	in	fourth	at	7.9%	(17	seats)
are	both	seen	as	radioactive	by	other	groups	but	possess	large	enough	percentages	to	make	coalition	forming
around	them	cumbersome,	unruly,	and	altogether	unstable.
As	the	party	with	the	plurality	of	votes,	OĽaNO	is	given	a	mandate	to	begin	talks	with	other	parties	for	coalition
forming.	Barring	the	obvious	cordon-sanitaire	placed	on	Smer	and	ĽSNS,	Matovič	is	left	with	a	handful	of	small
parochially	conservative	parties	that	if	cobbled	together	could	form	a	governing	majority:	SME	Rodina,	a	right-wing
populist	and	anti-immigration	party	that	borrows	much	of	its	positions	from	ĽSNS	(17	seats);	Freedom	and
Solidarity	(Sloboda	a	Solidarita,	SaS),	a	libertarian	and	Eurosceptic	party	(13	seats);	and	For	the	People	(Za	L’udí,
ZL’),	a	newly	formed	conservative	albeit	pro-European	political	party	formed	around	former	Slovak	president	Andrej
Kiska	(12	seats).
But	in	an	election	that	was	largely,	if	not	entirely,	a	referendum	on	the	incumbent	regime,	the	disparate	opinions,
goals,	and	aspirations	of	each	party	will	now	become	apparent	as	the	common	thread	of	unseating	Smer	was	met
and	second-tier	goals	become	deal	makers	or	breakers.	OĽaNO	is	conservative,	but	perhaps	not	conservative
enough	to	accept	a	partnership	with	SME	Rodina.	Yet	given	the	dearth	of	options,	the	post	Smer	government	may
resemble	a	rag-tag	group	of	parties	and	movements	that	are	stitched	together	simply	to	deny	the	second-place
incumbent	the	ability	to	govern;	an	arrangement	that	has	happened	elsewhere	in	Eastern	and	Central	Europe	over
the	past	twenty	years,	and	one	that	usually	ends	in	political	breakdown.
5.	 There	is	no	progressive	left-wing	movement	in	Slovakia
Beyond	the	collapse	of	Smer’s	political	authority	and	legitimacy,	the	most	glaring	issue	in	Slovakian	politics	today,
like	most	states	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	is	the	near	absence	of	any	true	left-wing	political	party.	While	often
derided	as	populist	and	nationalist,	Smer	is,	at	least	officially,	a	left-of-centre	party.	Its	loss	of	legitimacy,	coupled
with	PS/Spolu’s	disastrous	performance	at	the	polls,	means	Slovakia	is	dominated	by	right-wing	conservative
groups.
The	plight	of	the	political	Left	in	Eastern	Europe	stems	from	enduring	stigmas	of	socialism	and	anything	remotely
“Marxist”	as	emblematic	of	the	Communist	authoritarian	period.	Added	to	this	was	an	international	push	throughout
the	globalising	1990s	advocating	unfettered	free-market	capitalism	as	the	sinecure	for	all	political,	economic,	and
social	woes,	which	made	an	environment	for	social	democratic	parties	extremely	difficult	to	grow.	What	left-wing
parties	that	did	exist	followed	models	of	Third	Way	neoliberalism	that	looked	to	international	trade	and	eventual	EU-
membership	as	substitutes	for	state-sponsored	social	welfare.
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But	in	the	ensuing	decades	that	saw	a	widening	economic	gap	between	rich	and	poor	that	was	often	associated
with	the	politically	connected	versus	the	disenfranchised,	growing	public	dissatisfaction	was	exploited	by	a	new
collection	of	national	populist	parties	like	ĽSNS,	Fidesz	in	Hungary,	and	the	Law	and	Justice	Party	in	Poland.
Despite	all	of	them	being	right-wing,	xenophobic,	and	anti-global,	they	successfully	tapped	into	public	grievances
against	rising	costs	of	living	versus	stagnant	wages,	limited	social	services	that	had	been	cut	to	make	the	state
more	attractive	to	foreign	investment,	and	a	concentration	of	wealth	and	affluence	in	a	handful	of	urban	centres	at
the	negligence	of	smaller	towns	and	the	countryside.
Much	of	the	successes	of	right-wing	national	populist	parties	like	ĽSNS	and	similar	movements	throughout	the
region	stems	from	the	Right’s	ability	to	tap	into	legitimate	grievances	that	would	otherwise	be	defended	by	left-wing
socialist	groups,	and	channel	that	anger	into	protest	votes	at	the	neoliberal	status	quo.
The	popularity	of	populist	parties	isn’t	that	they	are	reactionary,	but	that	they	speak	to	issues	more	mainstream
parties	lauded	by	international	observers	as	standard-bearers	of	democracy	either	ignore,	are	unable,	or
uninterested	in	addressing.	The	majority	of	Slovaks	agree	their	country	is	systemically	plagued	by	corruption,
oligarchism,	and	clientelism.	Historically,	these	problems	were	targeted	by	left-wing	groups	advocating	social
democracy,	equality,	and	accountability.	Today,	these	causes	are	taken	up	by	national	populist	groups	that	frame
accountable	government	within	an	ethnocentric	model	of	national	defence.
In	so	many	words,	the	populist	Right	wins	where	the	progressive	Left	is	non-existent.	The	establishment	of	genuine
social	democratic	parties	that	represent	the	working	class	could	go	a	long	way	in	returning	these	right-wing
extremist	parties	both	to	the	political	periphery	and	below	the	parliamentary	electoral	threshold.
Following	last	year’s	presidential	election,	Slovaks	demanded	change,	and	in	so	doing	voted	the	incumbent	parties
out	of	power	in	parliament.	But	in	the	process,	they	also	placed	the	country’s	government	squarely	in	the	hands	of
anti-system	parties.	While	initial	signs	indicating	a	movement	towards	a	neoliberal	pro-EU	Centre	was	premature,	it
is	unclear	how	and	where	a	new	governing	coalition	will	direct	the	country.	What	is	clear	is	that	the	public	remains
mobilised	and	empowered	following	Kuciak’s	murder	and	Matovič’s	new	government	will	be	held	to	the	same
scrutiny	and	accountability	as	Fico’s.	It	also	implies	that	if	Smer-SD	is	ever	to	recover,	they	will	have	to	rebuild
themselves	after	getting	rid	of	Fico.
Stay	tuned.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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